In Ireland there are relatively fewer adverse drug reaction (ADR/yellow card) reports from doctors in hospital than in general practice. The aim of this study was to review the attitudes to reporting of ADRs of hospital doctors and to determine the effect of making yellow cards freely available. Methods A postal survey of actively practising doctors with follow-up of nonresponders was undertaken. We addressed the single most frequently claimed deterrent to reporting, unavailability of yellow cards, by making cards prominently available and placing one in patient's chart upon admission. In addition, doctors were regularly reminded that ADRs should be reported. Results Of 118 hospital based doctors, only 45% had ever reported an ADR. Fewer than 5% of pre-registration house officers had reported an ADR and the likelihood of reporting increased with seniority and was greater among physicians than surgeons. We found no evidence that doctors had published case reports in place of submitting ADR reports. Over 3 months, the greater availability of yellow cards and reminders about reporting ADRs led to an approximate five-fold increase in reports but reporting declined rapidly thereafter when verbal reminders were withdrawn, despite continued ready availability of cards suggesting that making cards available alone does not significantly increase reporting. Conclusions This study indicates there may be more fundamental constraints to reporting than attitudinal surveys would suggest and we need to explore additional avenues to ensure a 'reporting culture'.
Introduction available in a group that held such a view. The spontaneous reporting of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) is fundamental to the safety surveillance of marketed Methods medicines. A number of studies [1, 2] have suggested that
We surveyed 45% of 430 actively prescribing doctors fewer than 10% of ADRs are reported. Recently the representing all grades and specialties, working in three European Pharmacovigilance Research Group conducted a Dublin Teaching Hospitals. With an initial 30% response series of surveys in European Union countries to assess the rate following the first 100 questionnaires sent through the attitudes of doctors towards ADR reporting and identify internal hospital mail, we became aware that the majority reasons for under-reporting [3] . A primary objective of such had not received the questionnaire. Therefore, the remainder research is to identify what steps might be effective at (90) were contacted by phone or directly. Doctors were increasing the level of reporting. Studies in the United asked to indicate whether or not they had ever reported an Kingdom [3] and in Ireland [4] which use almost identical adverse drug reaction, the number of reports made within ADR reporting systems (the yellow card system) have shown the last year, 1-5 years previously or more than 5 years that hospital doctors are less likely than General Practitioners previously. Factors from previous studies [3, 4] that had to report adverse drug reactions.
been found to be important in the decision to report an As there is a greater use of new and more toxic agents ADR and those that had been noted to discourage reporting and polypharmacy within the hospital environment, we felt were included in the questionnaire and respondents were that a more detailed review of the attitudes of hospital based asked to rate these as important, unimportant or not sure. doctors was warranted. Furthermore, as earlier studies [3, 4] In the 2 years following this survey we reviewed the three had suggested that unavailability of yellow cards was the Irish Medical Journals, British Medical Journal and Lancet most important single deterrent to reporting, we were including correspondence section, the Science Citation Corporate Index and the institutional annual reports for publication of ADR reports from the hospitals.
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Following the survey, in the largest hospital we placed Short report yellow cards (similar to those in the United Kingdom) in Most respondents (93%) could identify a single most important reason for their reporting ADRs-seriousness of each patient's chart upon admission. Cards were also sent to each prescriber and made prominently available in each reaction, reaction to a new product, and a need to build drug safety profiles (Table 1) . When asked to rate a series of ward, doctors offices, clinics and any area where patients were treated. Prescribers were reminded both by circular recognised reasons for reporting as either important or unimportant a majority considered unusual reactions, reacand by direct contact of the availability and use of the yellow cards. We subsequently observed the number of tions to a new product and the need to build a drug safety profile as 'important' for reporting (Table 1) . Only 48% of reports returned to the National Regulatory Agency. After 3 months we ceased reminding prescribers to use the yellow respondents felt they could identify a single most important deterrent to reporting and unavailability of yellow cards, card system.
Statistical analysis was by Chi-squared test and Fisher's being too busy and unsure of how to report were the most frequently cited (Table 1) . Overall, putative possible deterexact test.
rents were more likely to be considered 'unimportant' than 'important' by respondents (Table 1 ). Comparing doctors Results who had reported an ADR with those who had not, the latter rated seriousness of the reaction more frequently The overall response rate was 65% and 118 questionnaires were completed by 23 Consultants, 48 Registrars, 25 Senior (P<0.05) as important. Similarly non-reporters cited 'unsure how to report' more frequently ( P<0.01) as a deterrent House Officers (SHOs) and 22 pre-registration House Officers (Interns). Only 45% of the respondents had ever than did reporters of ADR. During the initial 3 months, the Regulatory Agency reported an ADR and of this group 32% had done so within the previous year, 59% within 1-5 years previously and 9% received 24 ADRs compared with an average of 4 to 6 per quarter over the previous 2 years. The proportion, approximore than 5 years previously. When asked about the number of ADRs reported approximately half (51%) had mately 40%, of serious (fatal, disabling or resulting in or prolonging hospitalisation) ADRs reported and range of reported only one, while 28% had reported two, 11% had reported three and 8% more than three with 2% not being reactions was similar to that seen in the previous year but none involved new drugs. With the cessation of verbal and certain. The likelihood of having reported an ADR increased (P<0.05) with seniority of position Consultants (83%), written reminders to doctors but continued availability of cards, the number of ADR reports in the subsequent 3 Registrars (50%), SHOs (36%), Interns (4.5%). Doctors in medical specialties made more reports (50%) than those in months fell to fourteen (three involved new drugs, a similar proportion as in previous years). Serious reactions included surgical specialties (36%). anaphylaxis (mefanamic acid), ototoxicity (azithromycin), We were also able to look at the effect of addressing the most frequently cited deterrent, unavailability of yellow hepatitis (flucloxacillin), malignant neuroleptic syndrome (risperidone) and pulmonary embolism (norethisterone and cards by distributing over 8000. Whereas this did have a significant short term impact (an approximate five-fold oestrogen). In the 6 months following discontinuation of yellow card insertion into patients' charts upon admission, increase and 40% serious reactions), unless supported by frequent verbal or written reminders the availability of cards the level of ADR reporting from the hospital was similar to that prior to the intervention. In our search of medical per se had only a lesser temporary effect on the reporting rate. We appreciate that making yellow cards available journals we did not find any ADR report published by staff members of the hospitals under study.
within the BNF and through national centres [8] has increased the reporting rate but the extent of the increase and recent report from Oxford [1] that only 6.3% of ADRs Discussion are reported and of these only 6.5% involved newer drugs In three teaching hospitals, less than 50% of doctors have points to ongoing major obstacles. It is obvious from this ever reported an ADR. This low level is similar in the study that repeated and regular interventions are required to United Kingdom [3] where only 55% of hospital based maintain prescribers' interest in the system. We believe that doctors had ever made an ADR report. As reported there is a need to develop 'a reporting culture' and within previously [5] increasing seniority and working in medical hospitals this should incorporate other healthcare prospecialties increases the likelihood of reporting ADRs fessionals [9] as well as becoming a practical part of the presumably reflecting the opportunity to report. The finding curriculum for doctors in training. that less than one in twenty of interns mid-way through their pre-registration year had reported an ADR is of This work was supported by the Health Research Board of particular concern when one reflects that the purpose of Ireland. The co-operation of the staff of the Adelaide, Meath internship is training and developing high professional and St James's Hospitals is acknowledged. standards. With the welcome development of a core curriculum, we suggest that reporting a certain number of References ADR should be a mandatory core educational experience for pre-registration doctors. We have found previously to continue to use it after the incentive has been withdrawn. We found that the issues that prescribers claim encourage 22-23. and discourage ADR reporting were similar to those 3 Belton KJ, Lewis SC, Payne S, Rawlins MD, Wood SM.
identified in the recent surveys [3, 4] . In contrast to the again recently drawn attention to the possibility that younger not reveal a single case report of adverse reactions from those hospitals, leading us to believe that this is not an (Received 4 September 1996 , accepted 4 March 1997 important deterrent.
